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Problems in Transnational Acquisitions and Mergers
by Wilbur L. Fugate*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE DISCUSSION TODAY of the extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws and the Canadian response is extremely time-
ly. The opposing points of view and efforts to reconcile jurisdictional ques-
tions are very much in the limelight today, as indicated by the cases and in-
vestigations involving uranium, and those involving potash. The June 1977
meeting between United States Attorney General Bell and Canadian Cabinet
ministers on the subject of extraterritoriality in antitrust matters followed up
by a meeting of American and Canadian antitrust officials in August 1977 in-
dicates the importance which our two governments attach to the topic here
being discussed.
These governmental meetings are a continuation or a new beginning of
coordination between the respective antitrust authorities presently embodied
in the Mitchell-Basford Antitrust Notification Agreement entered into in
November 1969.' While I was with the United States Department of Justice,
we worked very closely with the then Director of Investigation and Research
under the Combines Act, now Judge D. H. W. Henry and the then Deputy
Director, now the Chairman of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission,
Mr. J. J. Quinlan. Such coordination and mutual discussion is essential and I
am glad to see the present activity along these lines. Presumably, discussions
of any proposed antitrust action involving a United States-Canadian merger
would take place between American and Canadian antitrust authorities under
the existing understanding. This also would be required under the Antitrust
Notification Resolution adopted by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) in 1967.
II. ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS
As Judge Henry pointed out in 1966 at a similar symposium on Mergers
and Joint Ventures as they Affect Canadian- United States Trade and Rela-
tions,2 "Canada is a relatively small economy having an industrial structure
characterized by a relatively small number of firms in Canada, many of
*Of Counsel, Baker, Hostetler, Frost & Towers, Washington, D.C.; former Chief,
Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice; author of
Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (2d ed. 1973); U.S. Delegate to OECD Restrictive
Business Practices Comm., 1961-1973. This paper was delivered at the Canada-United States Law
Institute's Antitrust Conference, held September 30, 1977, at the University of Western Ontario,
London.
I For an explanation of this agreement, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joint Statement (press
release, Nov. 3, 1969).
2 For a collection of the papers presented at this 1966 A.B.A. Annual Meeting of the Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law, see 32 A.B.A ANTrTRusT L.J. 156-214 (1966).
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which are subsidiaries of American parents."' He also emphasized that "[i]n a
market the size of Canada, the impact of the large international firm can be
relatively great and is likely to be more significant in any given industry than
would be the case in the United States with its considerably larger markets
and industrial structure." 4 Speaking again of multinational companies, he
pointed out that a "decision made by a large international firm to change its
competitive policy in the Canadian market or to refuse its Canadian sub-
sidiary the right to penetrate export markets in which the parent is interested,
can have a significant effect upon the state of competition in the Canadian
economy."5
The realization of these facts prompted the enactment in 1973 of the
Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA).6 This Act requires foreign
companies to apply to the Foreign Investment Review Agency before acquir-
ing control of a Canadian business or establishing a new business in Canada.
The proposed new Canadian antitrust law, Bill C-42, would make the FIRA
subordinate to the merger provisions of the new law. 7 The Bill would give the
new Competition Board power to prevent or dissolve horizontal mergers
covering more than twenty percent of the market. The Board, in considering
such mergers must take into account a number of factors which it deems rele-
vant, including the trend of concentration, size differential, degree of com-
petition by imports, barriers to entry, extent of innovation in the market,
likelihood of removing a vigorous competitor from the market, foreclosure of
supplies or outlets, the possibility of a less restrictive entry into the market
and, in favor of the merger, the likelihood that the merger will stimulate
competition. 8
The main thrust of the merger topic in the context of this Workshop's
overall theme would appear, however, not to be the proposed Canadian
merger law but the general rules as to the application of the United States
merger laws to United States-foreign, particularly United States-Canadian,
mergers and the extraterritorial effect of such application upon Canadian or
other foreign interests. The United States antitrust statute primarily applied
to acquisitions is section 7 of the Clayton Act,9 and, to a limited extent, sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act,10 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." Section 7 provides, in part, that no corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire the whole or any part of the stock, and if subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission, the whole or any part of the assets, of
I Henry, Mergers and Joint Ventures as they Affect Canadian-United States Trade and
Relations-A Look at the Canadian Antitrust Laws, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 156, 171 (1966).
4 Id. at 171.
5 Id.
I Foreign Investment Review Act (Bill C-132). For a text of this Act, see CURRENT
LEGISLATIvE DIGEST-CANADA, 29th Parliament, 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
7 Section 29, proposed new § 31.71(9)-(15).
4 Id. § 31.71(4).
- 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
Is Id. §§ 1, 2.
" Id. § 45.
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another corporation also "in commerce" where, "in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect . . .may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly."'
2
Antitrust acquisitions are usually treated as either horizontal, vertical or
conglomerate. Horizontal acquisitions are those between direct competitors;
vertical acquisitions are those flowing "backward" into a supplying market or
"forward" into a purchasing market; and conglomerate acquisitions are those
which are neither horizontal nor vertical.
The primary indicia testing the legality of acquisitions under United
States merger laws are market share statistics. Market share statistics,
however, are not always decisive and further examination of the market for
such factors as market structure, barriers to entry and adverse economic ef-
fects are also taken into consideration in order to determine whether or not
an acquisition will violate the law."3
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that since section 7
of the Clayton Act requires both the acquiring and the acquired company to
be actually engaged in United States interstate or foreign commerce, the ac-
tivities covered must be actually in, rather than merely affect, such com-
merce.14 The Department of Justice is supporting legislation to reverse this
case and to create the same test as that under the Sherman Act where the ac-
tivity complained of must only have an effect, usually said to be a direct and
substantial effect, upon United States commerce.' 5
In most transnational mergers and joint ventures the primary impact is in
the country where the acquisition takes place, that is, where the acquired
company is located. This is recognized in section 7 of the Clayton Act which
requires an effect in a "section of the country," that is, a section of the
United States. However, section 7 covers mergers regardless of whether the
acquiring or acquired company is located in the United States if there is the
required effect.
The United States courts in transnational merger cases have only looked
at the United States market since, as noted, the test is an effect upon a "sec-
tion of the country." This is also the thrust of the proposed Canadian merger
law and is certainly that of the present FIRA. Given the limits of jurisdiction,
sovereignty and apparent national interest, this is necessarily the case. It has
been suggested, however, that the national market is not the correct unit to
evaluate the effect of a transnational merger. Professor Richard E. Caves, in
a paper delivered in Canada during the Spring of 1977, stated that:
If a leading U.S. firm acquires a leading Canadian firm in its same
industry, concentration measured in each of the national markets will
initially be unchanged. However, it will rise in the two markets taken
1 Id. § 18.
s See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), where the United
States Supreoie Court took into account factors other than market percentages.
14 United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
"5 See, e.g., United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio
1949), modified and affd, 341 U.S. 543 (1951).
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together. Furthermore, if zhe U.S. firm was formerly exporting to
Canada, the concentration of all sellers in the Canadian market will
rise although the concentration of Canadian sellers stays as before.1 6
Professor Caves hoped that coordination among OECD countries might
handle this problem. However, this is not likely in the absence of some com-
mon market concept such as exists in the European Communities.
When we look at the transnational cases decided by the American courts,
those involving the acquisition by foreign companies of United States com-
panies, there are involved very much the same considerations as exist in pure-
ly domestic mergers. The level of concentration in the American market and
whether it is increasing is as large a factor as it is with domestic cases, and
the test is a significant anticompetitive impact in the relevant United States
market. If the foreign firm is already in the market, then the percentages of
the market, particularly those set out in the Department of Justice
Guidelines,1 7 will be important although later Supreme Court cases have de-
emphasized pure percentage evaluations. These Guidelines specify, for exam-
ple, that in a highly concentrated market the Department will usually
challenge horizontal mergers between firms accounting for as little as four
percent each of a market. In a vertical merger, as an example, the Depart-
ment will usually challenge a merger between a supplying firm accounting for
ten percent or more of the sales in its market, and a purchasing firm, ac-
counting for six percent or more of total purchases in that market "unless it
clearly appears that there are no significant barriers to entry into the business
of the purchasing firm."18 There are no guidelines specifically for transna-
tional mergers, but as will be noted, the guidelines for conglomerate mergers,
emphasizing potential competition, may be the most applicable.
Apart from actual competition in the United States market, the major
factor in either type of transnational merger is the potential competition doc-
trine. The primary idea here is that a merger may deprive a United States
market of a potential new entrant who would furnish competition in a con-
centrated market by de novo or independent entry. The merger may be held
illegal if one or both merger parties in a joint venture are on the edge of the
market and furnish a restraining influence upon prices in the market, that is,
by the threat of their entry prices would rise too high. Thus, a merger be-
tween a large foreign firm which is one of a few likely potential entrants and
an American firm which is a "leading firm" in its market may come within
section 7.
There are only a handful of United States cases involving international
acquisitions. I will first discuss those in which a United States company has
acquired a foreign firm. One involving a Canadian company was the Schlitz
1a R.E. Caves, Industrial Concentration, Corporate Size and Economic Power: The Un-
finished Agenda, speech before the National Conference on Competition Policy, held at the
University of Toronto, on May 13, 1977 (emphasis added).
17 U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, reprinted in [1977] 1
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
Is Id. 5.
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case,1 9 where the American company, Schlitz Brewing Co., acquired a large
interest in the Canadian brewer, John Labatt, Ltd. While this acquisition was
held illegal under section 7 of the Clayton Act primarily because it eliminated
actual, direct competition in the domestic market between Schlitz and a
United States subsidiary of Labatt, the court also mentioned the potential
competition between Schlitz and Labatt itself. The court referred to the con-
centrated state of the beer market in the United States and stated that Cana-
dian companies offered the greatest source of potential competition.2
In the Gillette case,21 the Justice Department brought an action against
the acquisition by the Gillette Co., the largest domestic producer and seller of
safety razors and blades ("wet shaving" instruments), of Braun, A.G., the
third largest manufacturer of electric razors ("dry shaving" instruments) in
Europe. The complaint alleged that if the acquisition was permitted to stand,
it would result in the elimination of Braun as a potential competitor in the
United States market; Gillette's dominant position in the United States
market would be enhanced; and mergers and acquisitions by other manufac-
turers of shaving instruments would be fostered. The complaint also charged
that competition between Gillette and Ronson Corp., its domestic competitor,
would be lessened in view of an exclusive patent licensing agreement,
originally a distributorship agreement, between Braun and Ronson. The case
was settled by a consent decree which required that Gillette create a new
United States company which would be a "fully operative, viable, going
business in the electric shaver market in the United States," and to cause the
new company to make an entry into the United States electric shaver market.
Gillette was directed to cause Braun to give an exclusive supply contract to
the new company and to transfer to it all United States patents pertaining to
electric shavers owned by Braun. Gillette was then directed to sell the new
company within two years after making it a viable company.
A case filed by the Federal Trade Commission attacked the acquisition
by Litton Industries of Triumph-Adler, a large German typewriter
company. 2 Previous to this, Litton had acquired the second largest domestic
typewriter company, Royal McBee Corp. The complaint alleged that
Triumph-Adler was an actual as well as potential competitor in the United
States market through its exports to the United States and distribution of its
typewriters in the United States market. The Federal Trade Commission press
release stated "in recent years the principal source of new entry has been
foreign typewriter producers." 23 The Commission, reversing the administrative
law judge, held that the acquisition was illegal and ordered divestiture.2 4
19 United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), affd, 385
U.S. 37 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1021 (1967).
20 Id. at 147.
21 United States v. Gillette Co., [1976] 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,691 (D. Mass. 1975) (con-
sent decree).
22 Litton Industries, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,267
(FTC 1973). But see W.R. Grace & Co., 71 F.T.C. 312 (1967).
'3 Federal Trade Commission (press release April 11, 1969).
24 82 F.T.C. 979, 1016 (1973).
5
Fugate: Problems in Transnational Acquisitions and Mergers
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1979
1979] EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST CONFERENCE 195
Subsequently, however, after reopening the case on the issue of damages, the
Commission agreed with the administrative law judge that in view of the
predominance of IBM and SCM in the typewriter industry, the divestiture
order should be vacated.
2
These cases have involved acquisitions of foreign companies by United
States companies. It is the other type of case, in which a foreign company ac-
quires a domestic company or an interest therein, or as in the CIBA case, 26 in
which two foreign companies merged with effects on the United States
market, which has caused the most reaction in foreign countries.
The British Petroleum-Sohio case, 27 for example, occasioned considerable
criticism in the British press. The press took the position that since the
United Kingdom had allowed giant United States companies to come into
Britain, the United States should do the same with United Kingdom com-
panies investing in the United States. The Department of Justice, however, in-
dicated that the United States welcomed British Petroleum into the United
States market through acquisition of the East Coast properties of Sinclair Oil
Company. When, however, British Petroleum and Standard Oil Co. of Ohio
(Sohio) proposed to merge, the Department indicated that it looked at the
case exactly as it would have viewed a merger between two United States
companies. Since Sohio had thirty percent of the Ohio market and British
Petroleum, now operating on the East Coast, was a leading potential entrant
into Ohio, this violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. This case was settled by
consent decree providing for a divestiture of part of Sohio's holdings in Ohio.
A recent United States merger case concerned the acquisition by the
British company, British Oxygen Company, of the American company, Air-
co, Inc. 28 The administrative law judge had held that the acquisition by
British Oxygen, the largest producer of industrial gases in the world, of Air-
co, the third largest producer in the United States with about sixteen percent
of the United States market, eliminated British Oxygen as a significant poten-
tial competitor on the edge of the market. The Court of Appeals for the Se-
cond Circuit, however, reversed the Commission, which also had held the ac-
quisition illegal. The court referred to the FTC's finding that "as of
December 1973, there was a 'reasonable probability' [that British Oxygen]
would have eventually entered the U.S. industrial gases market by internal
expansion, or its equivalent, but for the acquisition of Airco. '29 The court
stated that the FTC was correct in using the "reasonable probability" test,
quoting from United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.3 0 and Brown
25 85 F.T.C. 379, 380 (1975).
26 United States v. CIBA Corp., [1970] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (con-
sent decree).
21 United States v. Standard Oil Co., [1970] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(consent decree).
21 British Oxygen Co., Ltd., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,063
(FTC 1975), rev'd, [1977] 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,466 (2d Cir. 1977).
21 BOC International, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1977).
SO United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
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Shoe Co. v. United States,5 ' in that "§ 7 deals in 'probabilities' not
'ephemeral possibilities.' " However, the court reversed on the basis of the
FTC's statement that, "[s]imply because no entry had been effectuated at the
time the Airco opportunity presented itself did not mean that [British
Oxygen] would not have eventually realized its 'long-term objectives' of enter-
ing the U.S. market-by growth rather than by this major acquisition. '"3" The
court found that such an "eventual entry" test could not be the basis of a sec-
tion 7 violation.
The court in the course of the opinion held inapplicable the "toehold ac-
quisition" doctrine, that is, as applied to a foreign company, that a foreign
company may acquire a small firm in the United States market in order to
obtain a "toehold" in the market. The court considered acquisition of the
third largest company with sixteen percent of the market too large to come
within the doctrine."3
Potential competition was also at issue in the acquisition by Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey (now Exxon) which had large reserves of Canadian potash,
of the Potash Co. of America.' 4 Of course, Exxon was not a foreign com-
pany, but this was a paradoxical situation in which the court looked at a
United States company dealing in potash outside the United States, primarily
in South America, and considered it as if it were a foreign firm. The court
found that Exxon with its Canadian reserves would have probably entered the
American market independently had it not acquired Potash Co. of America.
Similarly, in United States v. Aluminum, Ltd.,"5 the complaint charged
that Aluminum's acquisition (through its American subsidiary, Alcan) of an
aluminum fabricating division of National Distillers Co. violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The case settled by consent decree, calling for the sale of a
fabricating plant, was one of a number of cases attacking similar integration
acquisitions by United States producing companies, which in the Justice
Department's view, threatened the United States aluminum fabricating in-
dustry, and so the foreign aspect was not paramount. While essentially ver-
tical in nature, there was an allegation that competition between the United
States company, National Distillers, and Aluminum, Ltd. in the sale of
aluminum products would be eliminated. The court subsequently relieved the
Canadian company from the obligation to sell the plant in question after it
found that Aluminum had made a good faith effort to do so without success.
Another vertical case involving the subsidiary of a foreign company was
United States v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp.,"6 attacking the acquisition by
31 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
11 BOC International, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 29 (2d. Cir. 1977).
31 Id. at 26 n.3.
14 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966). [1967] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 71,895 (consent decree). Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964).
11 United States v. Aluminum, Ltd., [1966] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 71,895 (D.NJ. 1966)
(consent decree).
11 United States v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., [1971] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 73,689 (D. Mass.
1971) (consent decree).
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Asiatic (one of the Royal-Dutch Shell Group, a fuel oil supplier), of the
Sprague Company, a distributor of fuel oil in the New England area. The
complaint stated that prior to the acquisition, Asiatic was a major supplier of
residual fuel oil to the New England market and that Sprague was the largest
deepwater terminal operator in that area. Therefore, the complaint alleged,
the acquisition foreclosed fuel oil suppliers from a substantial share of the
market and foreclosed fuel oil purchasers from a source of supply. The case
was settled by a consent decree providing for divestiture.
The Federal Trade Commission challenged the acquisition by Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI) of Great Britain, one of the world's leading
chemical companies, of all of the stock of Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., a
leading United States explosives company.37 The complaint alleged the
elimination of actual competition between the companies in blasting caps and
the elimination of potential competition by ICI in the explosives business in
the United States and in five submarkets. A consent decree ordered ICI to
divest the Explosives and Aerospace Components Division of Atlas, and pro-
hibited it from acquiring any interest in an American explosives business in
the United States for ten years without FTC approval.
The Department of Justice has reviewed other foreign company acquisi-
tions where no suit was brought. In connection with the acquisition of Inter-
national Salt Co. by the Dutch company, KZO, for example, the Department
asked the parties to hold up the acquisition pending an investigation. After
further consideration, the Department did not oppose the transaction, con-
cluding that KZO, while it was a substantial company in the salt business,
was not a likely independent potential entrant into the United States market
on its own. 8
Another transaction involving a foreign company was the proposed inter-
change of twenty percent minority stock interests by General Cable Corpora-
tion (GCC) and British Insulated Callender's Cables, Ltd. (BICC). The GCC
stock was owned by American Smelting and Refining Co. whose holdings
were subject to an antitrust consent decree. By a court-approved stipulation
in that case in June 1970, the government granted permission for the above
stock transaction conditioned, inter alia, on the requirement that BICC and
GCC would not use their less-than-controlling stock interest in one another to
fix prices, prevent mutual competition anywhere in the world, or to have an
officer, director, or employee sit on each other's board of directors.3
9
The CIBA case 40 presented the unusual situation of an antitrust suit in
31 Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,914 (FTC 1972) (consent decree).
33 McLaren, Antitrust Policy Today, speech before the National Industrial Conference
Board, Inc., held in New York City, on May 5, 1970.
31 Stipulation entered in United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., No. 61-241
(S.D.N.Y., June 29, 1970) (final judgment). See also U.S. Dep't Justice press release (June 27,
1970).
10 United States v. CIBA Corp., [1970] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (con-
sent decree).
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 2 [1979], Iss. , Art. 28
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol2/iss/28
198 CANADA-UNITED STATES IAWJOURNAL [Vol. 2:190
which the Department of Justice joined two foreign (Swiss) companies as
defendants in attacking the merger of their American subsidiaries. The com-
plaint charged that CIBA, Ltd. and J. R. Geigy, S.A. were negotiating to
merge their worldwide operations. If such an agreement were carried out, the
complaint stated, then a corporation would acquire the whole or part of the
stock or assets of either CIBA Corp. or Geigy Chemical Corp., their United
States subsidiaries, or the stock or assets of either. While this would be a
merger from the standpoint of the United States companies, it might be view-
ed as a joint venture from the standpoint of the Swiss parents. Its actual
reorganized corporate structure was not clear at the time of the suit or of the
consent decree. The arrangement had the same affect as the more usual
situation, that is, a joint venture between two foreign companies resulting in
a United States merger. The complaint alleged actual horizontal competition
in the United States market between the United States companies in dyestuffs
(7.7% and 10.3% market shares respectively), optical brightening agents
(10% and 19% of sales to the textile industry), and other products. Aside
from their foreign parentage, the only foreign aspect mentioned was that
both CIBA and Geigy purchased about sixty percent of their dyestuffs re-
quirements from Toms River, a joint United States producing company, and
the balance from their respective Swiss parents or from domestic dyestuffs
manufacturers.
The consent decree in the case included a direction that a new company
be formed, for sale within three years, to which the American companies
would transfer their dyestuffs and their detergent optical-brightening agents
businesses.
Where a foreign company has acquired a position in the United States
market through exports to the United States, such exports have in cases
brought so far, been considered the same as manufacture in the United
States, that is, the percentage of the market through such exports has been
held equivalent to a domestic market share. This was true in the Triumph-
Adler case, mentioned above, and this was also asserted in at least two other
cases; United States v. Schenley Industries, Inc.41 and United States v. Insilco
Corp.,42 both settled by consent decrees. In the first of these cases, the
market alleged was entirely an import market-the import of Scotch whiskey.
In the Insilco case, the acquisition by Insilco Corp., parent of International
Silver Co., an American company, of Stanley Roberts, Inc., an American im-
porter, allegedly substantially lessened competition in the sale of stainless steel
flatware in the United States market. International was said to have twenty-
one perdent of the market, and Roberts, through its imports, five percent.
The 1977 Antitrust Guide to International Operations,43 published by the
4 United States v. Schenley Industries, Inc., [1966] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 71,897 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (consent decree).
42 United States v. Insilco Corp., [1974] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,877 (D. Conn. 1974) (con-
sent decree).
43 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP-T OF JUSTICE. ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 15 (1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-l
(1977) and TRADE REG. REP..(CCH) No. 266, pt. 11 (1977).
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United States Department of Justice has one illustration of a transnational
merger, with facts somewhat similar to the Gillette case mentioned above.
The case actually is in contrast to the Gillette-Braun case in that in the il-
lustration, the American company acquires a small German specialty
manufacturer where there is no suggestion that the German company is
engaged in making sales in the United States and the company is not a poten-
tial entrant into the United States market.
In the illustration, an American razor blade manufacturer accounting for
about half of all United States and world sales proposes to buy a small German
specialty manufacturer which has developed a cadmium steel razor blade
arguably superior to the traditional steel blades offered by the American
company and other major companies here and abroad. It is also said that the
German company has been selling these blades in Germany on a low advertis-
ing budget and still accounts for less than one percent of all razor blades in
Germany. Its export sales to the United States are said to be insignificant and
the company has decided against manufacturing such blades in the United
States or abroad although it possesses the technical capability to do so. The
inquiries to be made by the Department in such a case are: (1) whether the
United States market or a relevant part therein is highly concentrated; (2)
whether the foreign firm is capable of entering the United States market and
is one of a relatively small group of such potential entrants; (3) whether the
foreign firm has incentives to enter the United States market; and (4) whether
the foreign firm has the capability of entering the market or threatening to
enter. Both the British Oxygen FTC opinion and the Schlitz case which are
cited as authority for these tests have been reversed, as noted above, on the
basis that a finding of probable "eventual entry" was not a valid test.
In assessing whether or not the foreign company is a "significant poten-
tial entrant" into the United States market the Department notes that in the
hypothetical case the German company is not an industry leader abroad and
has limited size and resources, and that even in its home market it has not
engaged in "the extensive product promotion so important to consumer pro-
ducts." Accordingly, the acquisition would not appear to violate section 7.
If the foreign company has a new product, the Department indicates that
this could be a factor which might change the conclusion should it be shown
that the new product is clearly superior to products now used in the United
States. An American patent on such a new product also might be an asset
subject to section 7's coverage of the acquisition of assets.
Now what does all of this mean as to when the United States antitrust
authorities will bring suits against transnational mergers and when United
States courts will invalidate them?
If a foreign company is actually manufacturing in the United States
market, or even if it is exporting to the United States market, its sales in that
market and percentage of the market through manufacture or imports, will
be the primary factor considered by American courts. It would seem that im-
ports should be treated differently since they are subject to being cut off for a
variety of reasons, for example, an increase in tariffs or a change in the at-
tractiveness of the American market vis-a-vis other foreign markets.
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As indicated, in many cases such percentages have been rather low where
horizontal competition has been involved. In United States v. General
Dynamics Corp.,44 the United States Supreme Court de-emphasized the im-
portance of percentages alone. While saying that under prior cases, the
government had made out a prima facie case by market share statistics in a
merger involving two coal producers, the Court took into account other fac-
tors which indicated a lack of an anticompetitive effect, such as, at that time,
coal's decline in popularity as a fuel, and the trend of utilities entering into
long-term contracts. The question of whether a producer had already tied up
its coal reserves also was held to be important.
As indicated, the primary question as to the merger of a United States
company and a foreign company not in the market has been that of potential
competition. However, the Supreme Court also has drawn back somewhat
from the application of this doctrine. In United States v. Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 4 5 the Court indicated that a precondition of the doctrine would in-
volve evidence that the acquiring company had the feasible means of market
entry other than by merger, and that such other entry offers "a substantial
likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other
significant procompetitive effects."
4 6
Even as stated, however, the doctrine has seemed rather strange to
foreign companies. It probably comes as a shock to a foreign company to find
that it is considered a potential factor in the United States market merely by
virtue of its sales in its own country. The companion idea of a United States
foreign merger resulting in entrenchment of a larger or dominant American
company in the United States market is probably easier for foreign companies
to understand since the emphasis is on the United States market rather than
on the foreign company itself. When we reach the situation of an entirely
foreign merger with effects in the United States, this is certainly likely to
cause repercussions abroad. The CIBA case, however, when boiled down to a
suit on a merger, in effect, between two American firms is readily
understood. The American courts have shown little hesitation in ordering
divestiture of acquired stock or assets when a merger has been held illegal.
This has been equally true in domestic and transnational mergers, and where
a United States company or a foreign company has been the company re-
quired to divest. This fact, however, so far has not occasioned particular
foreign government protests in section 7 cases.
The British government filed an amicus curiae brief in the British
Oxygen case, when it was before the Second Circuit, but this brief stated that
the government did not challenge the jurisdiction of the FTC. The brief did
state that if the decision were allowed to stand, "a significant new barrier to
the flow of foreign investment between the United Kingdom and the United
States will be erected.147 Attorney General Bell has referred to a merger
14 United-States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
4S United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
46 Id. at 633.
41 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (Sept. 1976).
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abroad which did affect United States commerce where comity played a large
part in the consideration of the United States Department of Justice. The At-
torney General stated:
Sometimes comity causes us to stay our hand. For instance,
about two years ago, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in-
vestigated a merger in a foreign country by nations of that country
who happened to be among the world's largest producers of an im-
portant industrial product.
The firms involved exported most of their production to the
United States, and significant assets of the combined firms were
located here. Further, while there was no evidence of an explicit con-
spiracy, the marketing of the product generally followed a pattern of
oligopoly pricing.
In short, there was not much question that the United States
courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over the merger. 48
Nevertheless, according to the Attorney General:
[T]he Antitrust Division concluded that since the merger involved
stock acquisitions of foreign companies on a public exchange in the
foreign country, and since the merger primarily involved control of
assets located in the foreign country, and since the government con-
cerned communicated to us that any attempt by the United States to
block the merger would be deemed a serious infringement of a vital
national interest, the Justice Department declined to assert U.S.
jurisdiction on grounds of comity and foreign policy. 49
The above instance is quite distinguishable from the CIBA case. The
products were American imports and there was not a resulting merger in the
United States. The Attorney General pointed out the absence of an explicit
conspiracy. Still, there would be no conspiracy if simply a merger were in-
volved. This instance of an exercise of comity indicates an awareness on the
part of United States antitrust authorities of the foreign reaction which can
be caused by an extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust
laws. In transnational merger cases, two or more countries may have jurisdic-
tion because a national of each is a party to the merger. With continued
dialogue between the United States and Canada, it would seem that United
States-Canada merger questions should be resolved without too much dif-
ficulty. The present United States transnational merger cases do not appear
to have transcended the bounds of comity as of yet.
48 United States Attorney General Griffin Bell, speech before the American Bar Associa-
tion, Chicago, August 8, 1977.
49 Id. Cf. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976), for a new formulation of the test for subject matter jurisdiction.
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